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The logical form of a generic sentence such as Dogs bark is usually analyzed, à la Lewis 1975, in
terms of an (unpronounced) two place operator GEN and its arguments, the restrictor dogs(x) and
the matrix bark(x): GEN x[dogs(x)][bark(x)]. (Our focus here is on simple characterizing generic
sentences with bare plurals and stative predicates.) See Carlson and Pelletier 1995 for an overview
of this standard tripartite analysis, and discussion of various complications. The semantics of GEN
is more controversial. But a promising approach assigns a generic sentence the truth-conditions of
a quantified modal conditional, ∀x(dogs(x) > bark(x)), where the modality is “normalcy” and >
is a variably strict conditional. See Delgrande 1987, Asher and Morreau 1995, and Pelletier and
Asher 1997.
But how do generics interact with other modals? I’ll offer one observation about an interaction
with might that presents a challenge for standard theories.
Wild mushrooms are a mixed bag — some are poisonous and some are harmless. So it is not
the case that if something is a wild mushroom then normally it is poisonous, but it is also not true
that if something is a wild mushroom then normally it isn’t poisonous. There is no generic truth
here. Thus, the following are both false:
(1) Wild mushrooms are poisonous.
(2) Wild mushrooms aren’t poisonous.
Of course, there are tricky cases with striking property or existential readings (Cohen 2004), but
the standard analysis predicts that there are pairs such as (1) and (2) that — in the right context
with the right disambiguation — are both false. Now consider the following “might-generic”:
(3) Wild mushrooms might be poisonous.
In the situation we are considering (3) is true. But does might have a wide-scope or narrow-scope
reading with respect to GEN?
Clearly (3) can’t express that the corresponding generic is epistemically possible — we know
that the corresponding generic (1) is false (in the relevant context). That is, the might here doesn’t
scope over the corresponding generic.
Instead, it seems to express the dual of the GEN operator in a way that is reminiscent of what
Lewis (1973) said about might-counterfactuals: “if A then might B” is equivalent to “not: if A
then would not-B”. But the challenge for the dual analysis is to compositionally implement the
“Lewisian equivalencies” whereby (3) is equivalent to (4).
(4) It is not the case that wild mushrooms aren’t poisonous.
The challenge, then, is to provide such an account in terms of the denotation of might and GEN.
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Note that it would not do to analyze (3) as saying that if something is a wild mushroom, then
it would normally be such that it is possible that it is poisonous. This treatment is analogous to
the contentious “would-be-possible” readings of might-counterfactuals (Lewis 1986: 63-4). But
then duality fails. Moreover, since might is epistemic, (3) comes out as false given that some wild
mushrooms are easy-to-identify as non-poisonous (cf. Lewis 1973: 80-1). So this, unfortunately,
gets the logic wrong.
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